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We investigate how emigration flows from a developing region are affected by xenophobic violence 
at destination. Our empirical analysis is based on a unique survey among more than 1000 
households collected in Mozambique in summe 2008, a few months after a series of xenophobic 
attacks in South Africa killed dozens and displaced thousands of immigrants from neighbouring 
countries. We estimate migration intentions of Mozambicans before and after the attacks, 
controlling for the characteristics of households and previous migration behaviour. Using a placebo 
period, we show that other things equal, the migration intention of household heads decreases from 
37 to 33 percent. The sensitivity of migration intentions to violence is larger for household heads 
with many children younger than 15 years, decreasing the migration intention by 11 percentage 
points. Most importantly, the sensitivity of migration intentions is highest for those household heads 
with many young children whose families have no access to social networks. For these household 
heads, the intention falls by 15 percentage points. Social networks provide insurance against the 
consequences young children suffer in case the household head would be harmed by xenophobic 
violence and consequently could not provide for the family.  
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Migration is one of the most important ways through which workers can improve their productivity 
and wages and increase their families’ welfare. While the overall effects of migration on host and 
source countries alike seem to be beneficial, there have been through history fears of natives in host 
countries that migrants increase the unemployment among domestic workers and lower wages. 
History is full of examples in which domestic workers took violent actions against immigrants in 
order to deter migration. Examples include the anti-immigrant violence in 19
th century New York, 
which was documented by Asbury (1927), the recent violence against Hispanic migrants in the US, 
or the xenophobic violence in Eastern Germany after German re-unification. 
It remains an open question how this form of violence affects migration and migration 
intentions. We here investigate how the migration flows from a developing region are affected by 
xenophobia and violent actions in a more developed host country. We investigate a hand-collected 
survey among more than 1000 households, administrated in Mozambique in summer 2008, a few 
months after a series of xenophobic attacks in South Africa killed dozens and displaced tens of 
thousands of migrants from neighbouring countries. Our identification strategy is based on the 
comparison of migration intentions of Mozambicans before and after the attacks occurred in May 
2008, and on the use of a placebo period in which no violence occurred. We control for differing 
characteristics of the household samples (from a wide range of survey demographic measurements) 
and previous migration behaviour. We find that other things equal, the intention of the head of the 
household to migrate after the attacks is lower than before; it decreases from 37 percent to 33 
percent. The sensitivity of migration intentions to violence is larger for household heads with many 
children younger than 15 years, decreasing the migration intention by 11 percentage points (p.p 
thereafter). Evidently, people are not only concerned about their own health, but also about the 
welfare of their offspring. Most importantly, the sensitivity of migration intentions is highest for 
households with many young children and little access to social networks. For such households, the 
intention falls by almost 15 p.p. Social networks thus provide insurance against the consequences 
small children suffer when the household head is harmed by xenophobic violence and consequently 
cannot provide.  
The small but growing body of literature on violence and migration has focused on out-
migration decisions in high-level violence environments  (see Mesnard 2009 on out-migration flows 
from Colombia, for example). Yet, very little is known on how violence and xenophobic feelings in 
host countries affect migration intentions and behaviour in source countries. To the best of our 
knowledge this paper is the first that measures how violence or other types of xenophobic behaviour 
in host countries affect migration intentions, and to what extent social networks in the source 
country may provide insurance against the risks associated with migration. 3 
 
Our findings relate to intentions to migrate. A host of papers has looked at migration 
intentions (for instance, Burda et al., 1998; Drinkwater and Ingram, 2008; Epstein and Gang, 2006; 
Fouarge and Ester, 2007; Lam, 2000; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; Papapanagos and Sanfey, 2001; 
and Ubelmesser, 2006). Manski (1990) has questioned the general use of migration intentions data 
as a proxy for actual migration, but emigration intentions have been shown to be a good predictor of 
future actual emigration behaviour (see, for example, van Dalen and Henkens, 2008). It has also 
been argued that intentions are a monotonic function of the underlying driving variables that 
motivate migration (Burda et al.1998). Finally, using migration intentions data avoids the sample 
selection difficulties that arise from the use of the host country data (see Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 
2004; van Dale and Henkens, 2008).  
Our results shows that violence in the host country reduces the intention to migrate. 
Violence has the smallest effect on people who live in small households and have few children, and 
the largest on people with many household members whose family is badly connected to social 
networks. Migration intentions of household heads with large families who have a good social 
network are much less sensitive to violence than the ones with bad networks. This confirms that 
social networks are an important insurance mechanism in developing economies. However, the joint 
facts that (i) better access to social networks reduces the sensitivity of migration intentions to 
violence although (ii) access to networks in Mozambique cannot provide protection against violence 
in South Africa, lend itself to the interpretation that migrant workers seem to care more about the 
future of their offspring than about their own health. 
The next section provides the necessary background on the two economies, Mozambique 
and South Africa, on the xenophobic violence in 2008, and the role of family and networks in 
Mozambique. Section 2 presents an illustrative model, and Section 3 the data. Section 4 discusses 
our empirical strategy that builds on the difference between the before and after violence intention 
to migrate, and the comparison with a placebo period that cannot be affected by the violence. 
Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 discusses a number of potential concerns about 
statistic identification. We then conclude.  
 
1.  Migration from Mozambique, violence, and the role of family and networks 
 
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world with a GDP per capita of $446 at current 
US dollars in 2008. Out of 22.7 millions population, 70 percent of Mozambicans live below the 
poverty line- and 35 percent below the extreme poverty line (PRSP, 2007).  Mozambique has had 
slow economic growth until the beginning of the 1990s, poor levels of education, especially of 4 
 
women, low productivity and a lack of employment opportunities. Basic infrastructure is lacking in 
many rural areas, whence the isolation of communities and poor integration of rural-urban markets 
(AfDB/OECD, 2003 and 2008). Faced with such poverty, migration is one of the few ways to 
improve the situation of a family. Because of its geographic proximity and much more advanced 
development, South Africa (SA) is the main destination of Mozambican migrant workers. SA is the 
African superpower and ranks as an upper-middle income economy with a GDP per capita of 
$5.666 in current US dollars in 2008. The economic gap between Mozambique and SA in terms of 
development and growth is striking. Hence, South Africa seems to offer large economic advantages 
to potential migrants in Mozambique. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows recent statistics about the stock of international migrants from 
Mozambique to OECD countries collected by Docquier et al. (2009). This dataset is collected from 
a population census in host countries where information about (legal) migration based on country of 
birth is available. The figures are quite similar to our representative household survey from two 
southern Mozambican Provinces shown in Panel B: the bulk of migrant workers from Mozambique 
go to South Africa. 
Our empirical strategy is based on the comparison of migration intentions before and after 
xenophobic attacks, that is, the third quarter in 2007, compared to the third quarter in 2008, and the 
placebo period, the first quarter in 2008. The next table indicates that macroeconomic changes are 
not a driver of changes in intentions that we will observe. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 presents figures on inflation and GDP variation. There is no particular change in the 
third quarter (our period of reference) in 2007 and 2008 in both countries. The inflation rate in 2007 
and 2008 in both countries follows the same trends in all terms of the year. At the end of 2007 
cumulative price variation was 8.2% in Mozambique and 7.1% in South Africa. The numbers are 
slightly higher in 2008 (10.3% and 11.5% respectively). GDP has the same trend, without large 
changes between quarters in the two years, with the exception of the third quarter of 2008 where 
GDP in Mozambique fell by 0.14%. If anything, this fall in the GDP should have triggered stronger 
migration intentions, had the xenophobic attacks not occurred.  
 5 
 
In May 2008, xenophobic violence exploded in South Africa. Violence was sudden: death 
and displacement rates reached a peak within weeks, as plotted in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
Since the early 1990s there had been isolated attacks on foreigners, but the scale and 
intensity of violence with which the events occurred were unpredictable for both national 
government and international organizations (Crush, 2008). The xenophobic riots in May 2008 
constitute the first sustained nationwide eruption of social unrest since the end of Apartheid. 
Between May 11 and June 14, 62 people, the majority of them foreign nationals, were killed by 
mobs in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and elsewhere. Xenophobic riots targeted foreigners 
living in townships and informal settlements in the main urban settlements of Gauteng and Western 
Cape provinces. The intensity of violence varied between provinces, in the Gauteng region the 
immigrants were exposed to intensive violence and victims often fled to escape imminent danger of 
being hurt or murdered. In the Western Cape province many fled in anticipation of the violence to 
come. The last reported attacks happened around one month later the 14
th of June, when a 
Mozambican man was burned alive in Atteridgeville township of Pretoria. At a stock of some ten 
thousand migrants in the affected region and 62 murders, there was a substantial risk, which 
explains the high displacement figures. Around 38,000 refugees were official reported by the 
United Nations but estimates of the number of displaced range between 80,000 and 200,000. 
(Igglesden et.al. 2009). 
Poor households in developing countries face substantial risk from multiple sources but have 
typically limited access to formal insurance and credit markets. They therefore have to resort to 
informal arrangements with other households. The theoretical literature suggests that small groups 
or networks (e.g. Genicot and Ray, 2003; Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl, 2010), with members who 
care for or trust each other and can punish reneging members, can achieve high levels of insurance 
(e.g. Altonji, Ayashi, and Kotliko, 1992; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; La Ferrara, 2003). The 
empirical evidence from a set of developing countries is consistent with these predictions (Ligon 
1998; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Dubois, Jullien, and Magnac 2008; Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl 
2009). A relatively common presumption is that the extended family is the most important resource-
sharing institution.  
Yet, Coate and Ravallion (1993) argue that this is a rather “romanticized view” of kinship-
based sharing systems, and it has been shown that committing to enforcement is more difficult in 
homogenous kinship groups, where family obligations (the ‘family tax’) are likely to play a role 6 
 
(Anderson and Francois 2006). Recent empirical evidence considering endogenous formation of 
risk sharing groups in an economic experiment concludes that “genetically related individuals tend 
to distrust one another and so do not group when enforcement depends on intrinsic motivations 
alone” (Barr et al., 2008; Barr and Genicot, 2008).  
Mozambique is peculiar in this respect. People in Mozambique predominantly organise their 
social life around their kin, and a person is perceived as ‘incomplete’ if she is not linked to an 
ascent group (including dead ancestors, through spiritism or witchcraft) or if she does not produce 
any descendants. However, polygamous marriages are common and much of family life is of 
temporary nature in Mozambique. Social relations typically extend into non-family forms, like 
relations with neighbours and xarás (quasi-kin), in addition to church relations, community group 
participation and friendships of varying degrees of formality. So alliances in southern Mozambique 
go beyond matrimonial linkages and beyond the kinship circle. This set of alliances defines a 
person, and the construction of this network is a subject’s major investment for socio-economic life 
in Mozambique.
2  
We thus measure social networks beyond family links and focus on the relation of the family 
with social organizations and members of the community. In order to take into account the 
heterogeneity of social interaction, we distinguish between participation in (institutionalised) groups 
that provide economic benefits and (informal) mutual social arrangements with key members in the 
community (Miguel at al. 2006; Gallego and Mendola, 2010).  
 
2.  An illustrative Model  
 
A simple model illustrates and sharpens our hypotheses. The model is not meant to explain 
migration decisions in general terms. Rather, it is supposed to explain while the migration decisions 
of some groups would react to violence in South Africa more intensively than others. In our model, 
households are heterogeneous with respect to two characteristics; first, the number of small 
children, and second, access to social networks. With respect to wages in Mozambique and South 
Africa we assume households to be homogeneous. This is correct with respect to wages in South 
Africa, but is a simplification with respect to Mozambique. We will, however, take this into account 
in the empirical part of the paper by controlling for wealth (as reliable income data are not 
available). 
                                                 
2  See Arfrend (2001) and  Luiz Henrique Passador “Tradition, person, gender, and STD/HIV/AIDS in southern Mozambique”, 
ttp://www.scielo.br/pdf/csp/v25n3/24.pdf) 7 
 
Consider a household which maximizes its utility over two periods. The household takes 
decisions in line with the unitary model. It can send one household member to South Africa to work 
and this decision is taken with a view to maximize household utility, i.e., we abstract from any 
potentially diverging interests within the household. In the first period the household has the choice 
to migrate or to stay in Mozambique. In the beginning of the second period, the household member 
in question works in Mozambique. We choose this setting to simplify; permanent migration could 
be incorporated into the model, but would not add much. Moreover, most of the migrants from 
Mozambique are temporary. 
We first look at the migration decision when there is no risk of violence. Assume that the 
household maximizes the sum of utilities over the migration decision m, where m = 1 stands for 
migration, and m = 0 for staying in Mozambique. To make things simple assume that time discount 
is nil, then the uitility of a family is U = U1 (w(m),c(m),N) + U2(w,N). The household’s first-period 
utility depends on the wage it is paid, the costs of migrations, and the number of young children N. 
If the household member migrates to South Africa, the household receives wSA > wMO, i.e. the wage 
in South Africa is higher than the wage in Mozambique. The household member then has to pay 
migration costs c. If he does not migrate, he receives wMO and incurs no migration cost. In the 
second period, the household always receives wMO. The household consumes any income it has in 
the period in which it accrues. Put differently, there is no access to credit markets.  
In this simplistic model, it is immediately clear that the household member will migrate if 
and only if the net benefit of migration wSA – wMO – c > 0. As we are not interested in knowing 
about migration decisions in general, we do not impose structure on the utility function with respect 
to the number of children N. Rather we want to know which groups should be most and least 
affected by the violence in South Africa. We hence allow for the risk of violence in South Africa to 
affect the second-period wage in Mozambique. Without violence, the wage at home would not be 
affected by migration, but when the household member becomes a victim of violence in South 
Africa, his productivity will be severely affected. The household member takes a risk to die or be 
severely hurt. Consequently, the expected wage in Mozambique in the second period can be written 
as E(wMO2 (m=1)) < wMO2 (m=0).  
To derive predictions about the type of household members most affected by violence in 
South Africa, it suffices to assume that 
2U/Nw > 0 (at least for a sufficiently large wage shock). 
This means that a decrease in the expected wage w will affect the utility of a family with many 
children more strongly than one with less young children. The idea behind the assumption is that 
when there is a negative wage shock, the household may not have enough income to feed its 
children, leading to famine, illness or death of children, which strongly affects the utility of the 8 
 
household. Our assumption is founded on a very simple fact. To keep a child (or any human being) 
healthy a minimum amount of calorie intake per day is required. A family with less children, other 
things equal, can adapt its consumption pattern to a change in income in a way that all children stay 
healthy, but a household with more children will ultimately reach the critical calorie level.  
The effect of access to a network is also quite simple: households that are in a network can 
get some transfer compensating in part for the wage loss. Consequently, the decrease in second-
period consumption will be weaker. Notice that we assume that network membership to be 
exogenous and that we are not concerned about investments in the network or how the transfer is 
paid back. We simply consider that network access can overcome (partially) the credit constraints 
developing economies suffer from. We do not claim any deep theoretical insights, neither do we try 
to explain migration decisions in general. Rather, we seek to explain the observed heterogeneity the 
in sensitivity of migration intentions to violence. 
 
3.  Data 
 
The data used in our empirical analysis is based on a unique survey conducted by Gallego and 
Mendola in 42 communities (both urban and rural) in 2 Provinces (Maputo and Gaza) in the South 
of Mozambique. The survey was conducted in August 2008 and contains information on household 
migration intentions after South African xenophobic attacks along with detailed demographic 
characteristics of household members, migration status, educational levels, household asset 
endowments, and formal and informal social networks from a sample of 1002 households.  
The sample is representative at the regional level and demographic, ethnic and community 
characteristics are very similar to distributions of the general population living in the South of 
Mozambique (Maputo and Gaza Provinces). The sampling design was subject to a standard two-
stage procedure, which first select communities (enumeration areas), and then households. In 
particular, our sampled communities were chosen randomly, weighting by the number of 
individuals using the most recent national Census implemented in 2007 by the Mozambican 
National Statistical Institute (INE). In each community the population has been canvassed prior to 
the beginning of the fieldwork to identify two groups, i.e. households with at least one current 
international migrant and households with no migrants. The target number of households has been 
drawn randomly from each of the two subgroups, in the same proportion as the actual migration 
rate.  
We designed the questionnaire to, among other things, shed light on the effect of 
xenophobic attacks in South Africa on migration intentions of people in Mozambique. The survey 9 
 
respondent is typically the best informed adult in the household. Although the survey instruments 
follow the methodology of the Living Standard Measurement Studies of the World Bank, they were 
tailored to allow accurate measurement of migration experience of each adult member in the 
household and migration intentions for different periods of interest. 
With respect to migration intentions, retrospective information was asked on current 
migration intention (in August 2008) and past migration intention (1 year earlier) of household 
members.  The brief period of time that elapsed between the time of the survey and the xenophobic 
attacks should foster a good perception of current and past intentions. Moreover, we can control for 
a “good old times” bias and for any other aggregate shock that might affect migration intentions 
even in the absence of xenophobic attacks by using the same information relative to a ‘placebo’ 
period (when no major occurrence had arisen).
3  
Thus, the survey questions are as follow: (i) ‘Do you or any member of your household have 
any intention to migrate to South Africa in the next 6 months?’, (ii) Are you aware of the 
xenophobic attacks occurred in South Africa in the last few months?’ (iii) Did you or any member 
of your household have any intention to migrate to South Africa in the last year?’ (iv) Did you or 
any member of your household have any intention to migrate to South Africa in the last 6 months? 
(placebo period)’. Answers to migration intentions were chosen from the pre-set list of four 
alternatives: ‘no intention’ ‘weak intention’, ‘strong intention’, ‘surely’. 
The survey instruments include socioeconomic and demographic characteristics followed by 
the information on migration experience and group participation. Data on migration of household 
members were also gathered, including information on duration and destination of migration, and 
whether migration involved moving costs and remittances. In addition, a community questionnaire 
was implemented to the community leader to collect information on the institutional and market 
organization, community infrastructure and social cohesion. 
Overall, 95% of our sample households report to be aware of the xenophobic attacks that 
occurred in South Africa in May 2008. Positive migration intentions are plotted in Figure 2. 33% of 
our sampled household respondent had no intention to migrate in 2008 compared to 37% 6 months 
and 1 year before the year of the survey. The difference between one year before and the placebo 
moment 6 months before is negligible while the difference to 2008 is statistically significant. 
Descriptive statistics of main variables of interest can be found in Tables 3 to 5.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
                                                 
3 See Vicente (2010) for a paper using a similar methodology. 10 
 
TABLES 3 TO 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 presents the distribution of migration intentions across the four categories over the 
periods of reference and we observe a decrease of any positive migration intention from 2007 to 
2008. The Tables show some asymmetries in migration intention between subgroups of population, 
such as households with different size, or households with different levels of ‘social networks’, 
which we will control for in regressions.  
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Descriptive statistics for our control variables are presented in Table 6, which reports 
demographics, educational attainments, wealth position, international migration experience and 
community characteristics. Data shows that 38% of households have a female head and the average 
household size is 5.4 members. If we look at the migration experience, 38% reported at least one 
current international migrant in the household and 27% has past migration experience.  
Household wealth is measured through a synthetic asset index weighting the ownership of 
various durable goods and the dwelling conditions. The methodology to build the index uses 
principal components analysis to assign weights to the indicator (see Filmer and Prichett, 2001) and 
a large number implies better economic position of the household.  
 
4.  Empirical strategy  
 
The estimation approach is based on comparing migration intentions about the periods before May 
2008 and after, while controlling for differing characteristics of the household samples (from a wide 
range of survey demographic measurements) and differing time perception. We estimate migration 
intentions as follows: 
 
t i i it t i T X M P           1 2 1 0  
 
where Pit is an indicator for migration intention in household i in year t  (with t=August2007, 
August2008); T1 is a dummy that takes the value one if the observation comes from the period after 
attacks (August2008), and zero otherwise; Mit measures the migration experience in the household 
at present and in the past.; and Xi is a vector of individual and family characteristics, including age 
education, household demographics, and community of residence. Standard errors will be estimated 11 
 
allowing for clustering at the household level as the error is serially correlated because of repeated 
observations for the same household. 
The main identification issue of this equation estimation arises from the fact that the 
estimated coefficient captures not only the effects of the attacks, but also of any other time-varying 
factors contemporaneous with the attacks that might have affected migrants’ intention behaviour. 
To disentangle the effects of xenophobic attacks from any other time trend effects of the economy, 
besides controlling for a wide range of household and community characteristics as well as 
community fixed effects, we include the “placebo period effect” in the equation as follows:  
 
t i i it t i T T X M P             2 1 2 1 0  
 
where  2 T  takes value one if the observation comes from the placebo period (January 2008). We 
expect the coefficient of this variable to be non-significant, as no major changes occurred with 
respect to August 2007. Yet, in order to control for migration seasonality issues, we further include 
as an extra control whether households experienced seasonal migration of household members. 
Furthermore, we investigate whether the household sensitivity to xenophobia at destination 
varies systematically according to key exogenous socio-demographic characteristics. Given the 
issues – pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003) – in the estimation of the marginal effects of 
interaction variables in logistic regressions, we present marginal impact effects of heterogeneous 
‘before-and-after estimates’ across sub-samples of households. In particular, we estimate 
heterogeneous effects with respect to the household structure and its engagement in community-
based social networks. With respect to the former, we divide the sample into two sub-samples 
according to the household size and composition. With respect to social networks participation, the 
subsample consists of households with and without membership in community-based socio-
economic groups. Finally, we estimate heterogeneous effects across the intersection of the above 
mentioned sub-samples of households, as to test to what extent households’ demographic attributes 
combined with social networks participation increase (or decrease) the cost of migration due to high 
risk at destination.  
 
5.  Results 
 
Table 7 summarises probit regression results, where the dependent variable is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention to emigrate of any household 
member (i.e. whether the answer to migration intentions reported above is any of the following 12 
 
alternatives: ‘weak intention’, ‘strong intention’, ‘surely’). The dependent variable is equal to 0 if 
the answer is ‘no intention’.
4 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to directly interpret the results, we report marginal (or discrete) effects, which are 
the changes in the predicted probability associated with changes in the explanatory variables. In 
Table 7, we begin with a restricted specification and then include household and community 
controls, community fixed effects and other specific controls related to the ‘placebo effect’. 
Controls include: gender, age and occupation of household head, household size, number of females 
and children (0-4) in the household, household ethnicity and religion, average years of schooling in 
the household, and a household wealth indicator. The last two variables are included also in squared 
terms as to allow for a potential non-linear relationship between migration intentions and the 
household skill and wealth position. We further include a dummy variable for urban areas and 
community level characteristics, such as the quality of roads, school and health facilities, formal 
bank and market availability. We finally rule out any unobservable community level characteristics 
potentially associated with variation in migration intentions and we fully focus on the within-
community variation by running specifications with community fixed effects (where the community 
is our primary sampling unit). Including community fixed effects allow us to control for any 
difference across communities which might affect the level of migration, such as differences in 
attitudes towards migration, migration history and networks, infrastructure and labor market 
characteristics.  
In all specifications, with both controls and community fixed effects, Mozambicans’ 
intentions of migrating is estimated to decrease after the xenophobic shock occurred in South 
Africa. Adding controls for the household migration experience does not reduce the significance of 
the post-attack drop nor its dimension. In particular, in the less parsimonious specification, other 
things being equal, the average propensity to migrate after the attacks is lower than before by 4.6 
percentage points (“p.p.” hereafter). Importantly, the placebo period has no effect on migration 
intentions - while controlling also for seasonal migration experience. The community fixed effects 
estimates in the two last columns of Table 7 show that if there are differences in the labor market 
conditions as well as migration experience across communities they are ruled out by focusing on 
variation within communities.   
                                                 
4 Since the ordered probit results are harder to summarize, we use the dichotomous measure by aggregating the different 
degrees of positive migration intentions and estimate probit specification. Yet, we also run ordered probit regressions 
using the four categories and results are available upon request. 13 
 
It is worth noting that there is a significant non-linear relation between the wealth index and 
the intention to migrate. In particular, at low levels of wealth a marginal increase in wealth raises 
propensity to migrate. For better-off households, instead, a marginal increase in wealth decreases 
migration intention. This reflects the fact that migration is both a costly and risky process, but also 
remunerative in terms of remittances, such that poorer households facing less credit constraints may 
need to migrate more than richer households
5.  
Overall, our results on the time dummies suggest that a drop in the propensity to migrate 
between August 2008 and August 2007 is attributable to South African violence episodes that 
occurred in May 2008. Above results represent an average from very heterogeneous households.  
To learn more about how different types of households behave, and what role social 
networks play, we run the same probit regressions in a set of population sub-samples according to 
some predetermined household characteristics. These models assess whether and how much these 
household characteristics reduce (or increase) the cost of xenophobic violence at destination. Tables 
8-10 present probit marginal effects for a set of sub-groups defined by observable household 
attributes correlated with both migration intentions and the risky nature of migration behaviour, that 
is (i) the number of household members (both adults and children); (ii) the degree of household 
engagement in community based social networks (i.e. household membership in a community group 
and household engagement in informal exchanges of goods or services with other households in the 
community); (iii) the intersection of both household structure and social networks. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results show that larger households are more sensitive to the xenophobic shock – in other 
words, the average decrease in migration intentions after the shock is mostly due to large 
households’ responses. Furthermore, other things equal, households with more children (i.e. more 
than 4 children of 0-15 years old) are less likely to migrate after the shock by 11 p.p. (Panel B- 
Table 8).  
In addition, we run regressions differentiating households according to the number of female 
members as to control for the fact that while household heads are keen to insure welfare of their 
family, women’s labor supply at home might perform an insurance function at household level. Yet, 
this is not the case as results go in same direction as above with xenophobic attacks affecting more 
the intention to migrate of households with many females (Panel C- Table 8). This reflects the 
                                                 
5 The estimated parameters of wealth index and the square term, in any specification of table 7, show that the maximum 
on the relation between migration intention and wealth belongs to the relevant interval of the wealth index (see table 6 
and table 7 for a comparison).  14 
 
strong patriarchal structure of the Mozambican society, particularly in the South of the country, and 
the extremely low participation of women in the labor market as well as in several aspects of the 
local socio-economic life. We have also run robustness checks including adult children, who 
through their work may provide some insurance in case the household head is affected by violence, 
but nothing changes (see Tab A1 in Appendix). 
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 9 reports the same regression specification as above across subsamples of households, 
according to their engagement in community-based social networks. Results show that households 
with no group membership or no informal social networks are less likely to migrate after the shock 
by more than 6 p.p. This seems to suggest that people who do have access to a social buffer have a 
much lower sensitivity of migration intentions than people who have no access to social networks.  
 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 10 we further explore the interplay between family structure and social insurance in 
affecting risky migration behaviour. Results show that social networks do not have the same 
‘mitigating effect’ effect on migration intentions when people have few children or households are 
small. Large families with no social networks, however, significantly decrease their likelihood to 
migrate by 15 p.p.. This seems to suggest that, according to the theory, having family (and children) 
has a deterrent effect in risky migration behaviour, but if the family is ‘well connected’ this 
mitigating effect disappears. 
So far we have run separate regressions for household sub-samples as to allow the effect of 
xenophobic attacks to interact with household level characteristics. In order to test whether the 
difference between our heterogeneous before-and-after estimates are statistically significant, we run 
specifications with controls for the interactions between the xenophobic shock – as well as the 
placebo variable - and household level characteristics that influence both the degree of risk and 
insurance. Results reported in Tables A2-A5 in Appendix test the main effects of the xenophobic 
attacks and the household level characteristics, while also testing if the xenophobic shock has an 
effect on the slopes of these characteristics. Because in probit regression the interpretation of 15 
 
interaction effects is complicated (Ai and Norton, 2003), we only report the coefficients (not odds 
ratios) and concentrate on significance and direction.
6 
In Table A2 we test interaction effects of the xenophobic shock with household 
demographic characteristics, i.e. household size, number of children and number of females, using 
the latter as continuous (panel A) and discrete variables (panel B). The same variables are interacted 
with the placebo period. Table A3 adds to models in Table A2 community fixed effects as controls. 
In Table A4 we test interaction effects with household group participation. Overall, compared to 
models in Tables 8-9, we find consistent results for household-level variables and interaction terms. 
While the main effect of the time dummy for the xenophobic shock is not significant, the time 
dummy interacts significantly with the three household demographic characteristics. This is to say 
that household demographic characteristics have a significant impact on the difference of migration 
intentions before and after the xenophobic shock. In particular, large households, and households 
with many children and females are significantly more sensitive to the xenophobic shock with 
respect to smaller households or families with few dependents. Households with group 
membership, on the other hand, are not significantly more (or less) sensitive to the xenophobic 
shock, whilst the latter still has a significant negative main effect on migration intentions.
7 
Finally, Table A5 reports regression results including interaction effects of time dummies 
with the three groups of demographics combined with household group participation. In particular, 
building from models in Table 10, we estimate an equation that allows for differences in migration 
intentions among four groups: small households with group membership, large households with 
group membership, small households with no group membership, and large households with no 
group membership. The estimation of a specification with three dummy variables (and one base 
category) allows us to assess the proportionate difference in migration intentions with respect to the 
base group. Results show that households with many children and no group membership are 
significantly more sensitive to the xenophobic shock with respect to small households with no 
group membership (base group)- but the same does not hold for large households with group 
membership, whose coefficient is not significant. This seems to suggest that the latter group of 
households is more protected via group membership. 
Overall, the results are consistent with our predictions: violence has the smallest effects on 
migration intentions in households without kids and the largest on people with kids whose family is 
                                                 
6 We also run additional models to estimate interaction effects. We run both Linear Probability Models (LPM) and 
probit model marginal effects using the command inteff in Stata developed by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). The latter 
command allows to compute the correct marginal effect and significance of the interaction variable in a probit model. 
Results are consistent with those reported in Tables A2-A5 in Appendix (results available upon request).  
7 We also test interaction effects of informal social ties as a measure of social networks, finding similar results as using 
household group participation (results available upon request). 16 
 
badly connected. People with kids who have a good network will be less sensitive than the ones 
with bad networks.  
 
6.  Discussion 
 
A first important question is whether networks may affect labor outcomes in South Africa. Consider 
that people who are better connected in Mozambique would receive higher wages. We would then 
measure a simple wage effect, rather than the insurance effects of social networks against the risk of 
death or injury of the household head. The wage effect would, however, not explain why it is 
particular families with young children whose migration intentions are affected by social networks. 
Moreover, we know that migrants from Mozambique sell their work on the South African spot 
market to South Africans. (Table 11 lists the distribution of occupations among our sampled 
individuals employed in SA.) 
  
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Being connected in Mozambique thus should not substantially affect the South African labor 
market outcome. Network membership may affect the wage in Mozambique, though. But if 
anything, this would make our results even stronger, because it would imply that connected people 
would be less, and not more likely to migrate. 
  A second, related, question is whether being a network member could reduce the risk of 
being harmed in South Africa. However, it seems little convincing to believe that network 
membership in Mozambique could help people against street violence in South Africa, where 
people who would be identified as non-natives could become victim at any time during the riots. 
A third concern is that people with higher levels of trust in the society as a whole participate 
more in social networks and also are more willing to take the risk and migrate to South Africa. If 
this was the case we would be capturing a spurious relation between networks and migration 
intentions. Yet, this argument would entail that people’s trust should be related to both Mozambican 
and South African society in the same way, which is unlikely given the large differences between 
the two countries. And, this argument would still fail to explain why it is in particular in large 
families where migration intentions decrease. 
On a more general level, it could be argued that social networks are not exogenous to 
migration behaviour. There is indeed ample evidence that immigrants’ social networks in the 
country of destination are important, because former migrants help newcomers to settle down, while 17 
 
far less evidence exists on the role of group participation and social arrangements at origin (see 
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009, for an exception).  However, we have evidence that indicates that it 
this is not the case in Mozambique. Rather, family plays an important role on migration behaviour 
(see Table 12).  
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
Household with migrants in our survey answered that the main source of help in the 
migration process was family members at origin or destination (46% for current migrants and 51% 
for returned migrants), followed by their own experience (34% for current migrants and 24% for 
returned migrants). In addition, family members give housing at destination to the new migrants 
(40% of current migrants live with some family members). Second, as we have included community 
fixed effects in our estimates, we do control for the community migration network (i.e. the 
proportion of former migrants in a given community), which could lower the costs of migrating and 
finding a job at destination (cf Massey, 1988; Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994; Dolfin and 
Genicot, 2006; McKenzie and Hillel Rapoport 2007). Notice also that we do not look at the onset of 
the migration phenomenon in Mozambique, when social help through networks would be 
particularly important. Rather, migration between Mozambique and South Africa is a long-lasting 
and widespread phenomenon. While Mozambicans have historically been the main labour force for 
South African mines, most of today’s migration from Mozambique is not permanent (life cycle), but 
temporary or circular migration, for which the role of networks is believed to be less important 
(Massey, Goldring and Durand, 1994).
8  
The SA Census in 2001
9 shows that Mozambicans are low-skill migrants and they do not 
cluster at one particular occupation as would likely be the case if a migration network is acting at 
destination. Migrants serve in different occupations (agricultural, mining, construction and retail 
trade, see panel A and panel B of Table 13).  
 
TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel C of Table 13 also shows that Mozambican migrants spread over four provinces 
located in the north region of South Africa (North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo). 
Panel C shows that 97% of Mozambican migrants do not cluster but spread over the four northern 
                                                 
8 From our survey we know that 80% of the current migration is temporary migration. The average duration of the 
migration spell by returned migrants is nine months.  
9 The most recent South African census refers to the year 2007, but there is not information on the country of origin for 
migrants. The census of 1996 shows the same path that those presented here for the 2001 census.   18 
 
provinces in South Africa (North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpop), which is consistent 
with the idea of cross-border migration phenomenon between Mozambique and South Africa. The 
path of location is similar to the flows of migrants from other African countries (with Zimbabwe as 
the main sending country after Mozambique), but different from the location of non-African 
migrants who cluster mainly on two provinces Western Cape (the region of Cape Town) and 
Gauteng (the region of Johannesburg). 
We hence argue that group participation in Mozambique is exogenous to migration 
behaviour and labor market outcomes (wages) of immigrants in South Africa, as well as to the 
migrant’s likelihood to be hit by xenophobic attitudes in regions of destination. 
Finally, by comparing migration intentions from different communities in a single one-year 
period (before and after exogenous xenophobic shocks), we are much less concerned about the 
interaction between community networks and labor market outcomes in Mozambique as well. This 
is so as access to groups and social networks is not an open process, but there are frictions to 
participation such as transactions costs, imperfect commitment, asymmetric information, lack of 
enforceability or any other process that limits informal social arrangements (see Fafchamps, 2002, 
Ligon et al., 2002). Thus, we can rule out the possibility that households start joining networks at 
origin due to xenophobic attacks at destination over such a short period of time.  
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
By using a unique representative household survey collected in Southern Mozambique in summer 
2008 we have shown that migration intentions to South Africa have been affected substantially after 
violent xenophobic attacks. Migration may have important development effects on both South 
Africa and other African origin countries. However, given the hardening of anti-immigration 
feelings and xenophobic behaviour, not only in South Africa, it is of interest to understand how 
these attitudes at destination affect out-migration behaviour in countries of origin.  
Our identification strategy is based on the comparison of migration intentions of 
Mozambicans before and after the attacks occurred in May 2008, and on the use of a placebo period 
in which no violence occurred. Our results show that other things equal, the migration intention of 
household heads decreases by no less than 4 p.p. after the attacks. We also estimate heterogeneous 
before-and-after effects across sub-samples of households according to some predetermined socio-
demographic characteristics. We find that the impact of violence on migration intentions is largest 
for household with many young children. Access to social networks mitigates the perceived danger, 
though. The sensitivity of migration intentions is highest for those household heads with many 19 
 
young children whose families have no access to social networks. For these household heads, the 
intention falls by 15 p.p. Social networks hence seem to play an important role as an insurance 
device against the risks associated with migration. Social networks in the country of origin cannot 
offer protection against violence in the destination country, but they can insure families against the 
income losses owing to injury or death of the household head. According to our study, violence in a 
destination country may constitute a massive obstacle for migrants, in particular, for those that leave 
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Figure 2: Incidence of positive migration intention over time
Source: Authors' calculation from several newspapers, magazines and news cables (e.g. CNN, BBC, ABC, Le Monde, El 
Pais, Times ZA, The Guardian) 
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May 11 May 18 May 25 May 30 June 8 June 14
Date from May 11 to June 14
Displaced in 20081990 2000
South Africa 95.50% 93.80%
Other OECD country 4.50% 6.20%
South Africa 90.30% 97.90%
Other african countries 8.30% 1.50%
Other (Europe/USA) 1.30% 0.60%
Table 1: International migration in Mozambique
Panel A: Mozambican immigrants by OECD country of destination*
*Source: Docquier et al (2009) 
Panel B: Mozambican emigrants by country of destination (2008)**
Past Migrants Current Migrants
**Source: Our survey in Southern Mozambique.2007 2008 2007 2008
1 11.04 9.62 1.33 4.52
2 9.04 10.35 1.62 1.2
3 8.55 10.68 1.77 -0.14
4 8.16 10.33 1.93 3.4
Annual 8.2 10.3 6.7 6.3
2007 2008 2007 2008
1 6.1 10.6 2.01 -3.4
2 7.1 12.2 2.72 3.66
3 7.2 13.1 2.16 0.9
4 9 9.5 2.7 0.8
Annual 7.1 11.5 5.5 3.7
Table 2: Macro-economic indicators for Mozambique and SA
Quarter
CPI variation 12 months GDP variation (%)
(average) Quarter var.
Notes: CPI variation is the change from one quarter with respect to the same quarter in the 
previous year. Change in GDP is the variation with respect to January of each year (so that 
the cumulated variation in the first quarter is from January 1st to March 30th- and the annual 
variation is from January 1st to December 31th). 
Mozambique
South Africa
Sources: World Bank, Insituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) and Statistics South Africa.Now (Aug-08)
1 year earlier (Aug-
07)
6 months earlier (Jan-
08)- placebo period
Total
No intention 66.89 63.29 62.91 64.36
Weak Intention 9.05 10.79 12.35 10.73
Strong intention 11.31 11.84 11.63 11.59
Surely 12.75 14.08 13.11 13.31
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 3- Migration intentions over time (%)Now (Aug-08)
1 year earlier 
(Aug-07)




No intention 73.31 74.48 73.62 73.81
Weak Intention 9.63 5.39 9.07 8.03
Strong intention 6.59 9.34 7.77 7.9
Surely 10.47 10.79 9.54 10.27
No intention 50.96 50.98 60.22 54.06
Weak Intention 18.5 17.59 10.6 15.56
Strong intention 13.87 13.89 13.66 13.81
Surely 16.67 17.53 15.52 16.57
Table 4- Migration intentions over time by household size (%)
Hh sub-sample with small household size (<4)
Hh sub-sample with big household size (>7)Now (Aug-08)
1 year earlier 
(Aug-07)




No intention 61.82 61.67 66.89 63.46
Weak Intention 10.93 12.32 8.84 10.7
Strong intention 10.92 11.37 9.97 10.75
Surely 16.33 14.64 14.31 15.09
No intention 67.34 66.3 66.92 66.85
Weak Intention 10.41 12.41 9.64 10.82
Strong intention 14.37 12.36 14.99 13.91
Surely 7.88 8.93 8.46 8.42
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 5- Migration intentions over time by hh group membership/ social network (%)
Hh sub-sample with no group membership
Hh sub-sample with group membershipVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female HH head (%) 2706 0.39 0.49 0 1
Age of HH head 2706 45.76 16.63 16 99
HH size 2706 5.41 3.03 1 15
Number of Female in HH 2706 2.75 1.80 0 11
Number of children in HH (< 5 years) 2706 0.66 0.88 0 6
Average HH years of schooling 2706 4.04 2.81 0 14
HH head-occupation-farmer (%) 2706 0.36 0.48 0 1
Wealth Index 2706 0.00 2.15 -3.7 7.3
HH migration experience (current) 2706 0.39 0.49 0 1
HH migration experience (past) 2706 0.26 0.44 0 1
Being informed about attacks in SA 2706 0.95 0.21 0 1
Ronga 2706 0.13 0.34 0 1
Chope 2706 0.01 0.09 0 1
Changana 2706 0.83 0.37 0 1
Other ethnicity 2706 0.03 0.16 0 1
No religion 2706 0.12 0.32 0 1
Catholic 2706 0.17 0.38 0 1
Spiritism 2706 0.44 0.50 0 1
HH in urban area (%) 2706 0.37 0.48 0 1
Community varaibles
Paving Rosad 2706 0.11 0.32 0 1
Primary school  2706 0.66 0.48 0 1
Bank 2706 0.04 0.19 0 1
Market 2706 0.39 0.49 0 1
Health center 2706 0.20 0.40 0 1
Table 6: Summary statistics of households level controlsTable 7: Probit marginal effects of positive migration intentions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.040*** -0.039** -0.041** -0.043** -0.046** -0.046**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Tdummy (Jan 08)- placebo 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
HH migration experience (current) 0.240*** 0.262*** 0.263***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
HH migration experience (past) 0.163*** 0.189*** 0.188***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Seasonal migration experience -0.010 -0.027 -0.033
(0.083) (0.086) (0.085)
Female HH head -0.073* -0.081** -0.076* -0.071*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040)
Age of HH head -0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age of HH head squared -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH size (including migrants) 0.035*** 0.016 0.023** 0.023**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of females in the HH 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Number of children in the HH (<5years-old) -0.011 -0.016 -0.022 -0.020
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Average hh years of schooling -0.003 -0.023 -0.054** -0.053**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Average hh years of schooling squared -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HH head occupation- farmer -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.167*** -0.166***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
Wealth index (c) 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.029** 0.028**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Wealth index squared -0.006* -0.007** -0.006* -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban area -0.075* -0.079* 0.119 0.128
(0.041) (0.041) (0.296) (0.297)
Being informed about attacks in SA -0.104
(0.103)
Ethincity, religion controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Community controls no  no yes yes  no no
Community Fe no no no no yes yes
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701
Robust standard errors clustered at housheold levels in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) The reference 
category is August 2007. (c) The wealth index is the first component of a principal component analysis, which uses dwelling conditions and assets ownership of the HH. 
(d) Columns 5-6 show estimates with fixed effects at the community level. (e) Further household chacteristics include ethnic group (Changana, Ronga, Chope, Other 
minorities) and religion (Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, Anglican, Baptist, Adventist, Islam, Tradition spiritsm, other). (f) Community level characteristics include th
quality of roads, school, health facilities, formal bank and market availability. Low (<4) High (>6)
Tdummy (Aug 08)b 0.005 -0.109***
(0.028) (0.034)
Tdummy (Jan 08) 0.004 0.011
(0.017) (0.020)
HH migration experience (current) 0.186*** 0.266***
(0.063) (0.063)
HH migration experience (past) 0.212*** 0.149**
(0.066) (0.073)
HH and community controls yes yes
Observations 1398 905
Low (<2) High (>4)
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.003 -0.111***
(0.029) (0.035)
Tdummy (Jan 08) -0.016 0.005
(0.016) (0.018)
HH migration experience (current) 0.178*** 0.203***
(0.062) (0.059)
HH migration experience (past) 0.067 0.100
(0.071) (0.070)
HH and community controls yes yes
Observations 1216 950
Low (<2) High (>4)
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.013 -0.136***
(0.025) (0.041)
Tdummy (Jan 08) -0.010 0.017
(0.012) (0.021)
HH migration experience (current) 0.212*** 0.331***
(0.062) (0.070)
HH migration experience (past) 0.214*** 0.046
(0.064) (0.081)
HH and community controls yes yes
Observations 1383 733
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive 
intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) Control variables are: Seasonal migration experience, Female HH 
head, Age of HH head, Age of HH head squared, HH size, Number of females in the HH, Number of children in 
the HH (<5years-old), Average hh years of schooling, Average hh years of schooling squared, HH head 
occupation- farmer, Wealth index, Wealth index squared, Ethnicity, Religion, Urban area, Community 
characteristics (paved-road, primary school, Bank, market, health facility). (c) We distinguish between 'low' and 
'high' sub-groups by using always the first two and the last two quantiles of all demographic variable distribution.
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 8: Heterogeneous probit models- marginal effects (c)
Panel A: HH size
Panel B: N.of children (<15 years old)
Panel C: N.of femalesTdummy (Aug 08)b -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.008 -0.002
(0.020) (0.021) (0.041) (0.041)
Tdummy (Jan 08) -0.002 0.013
(0.014) (0.019)
HH migration experience (current) 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.134* 0.134*
(0.046) (0.046) (0.070) (0.070)
HH migration experience (past) 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.093 0.093
(0.060) (0.060) (0.077) (0.077)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 1996 1996 684 684
Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.073*** -0.069*** 0.026 0.021
(0.019) (0.021) (0.042) (0.042)
HH migration experience (current and past) 0.007 -0.008
(0.014) (0.017)
Migr experience before the war 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.101 0.101
(0.045) (0.045) (0.081) (0.081)
Tdummy (Jan 08)- placebo 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.087 0.087
(0.058) (0.058) (0.077) (0.077)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 1799 1799 884 884
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 9 Heterogeneous probit models- marginal effects
Panel B: Community group membership
NO group member Group member
Panel B: Informal social networks
NO inter-hh exchange Inter-hh exchange
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration 
(0 otherwise). (b) Control vars are as in Table 8. (c) Group membership is a binary variable equal to 1 if any member of the household 
has participated in any of the following community group: ROSCAs, bank, farmers association, burials association, ONGs actions, self-
help religious group, political group, women group, civic group, migrant's group, young group, others. (d) Give or receive a binary 
viariable equal to 1 if the HH has given or received products or services in the last month from at least one of the following key persons 
in the community: traditional leader, elected leader, teacher, agricultural agent, priest, neighbours, health provider, healer, employer.No group 
member Group member No group member Group member
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.018 0.058 -0.141*** -0.075
(0.031) (0.055) (0.041) (0.072)
Tdummy (Jan 08) 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.028
(0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.036)
HH migration experience (current) 0.210*** -0.063 0.282*** 0.307**
(0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.129)
HH migration experience (past) 0.273*** 0.105 0.150 0.104
(0.086) (0.095) (0.094) (0.123)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 1101 288 614 282
No group 
member Group member No group member Group member
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.030 0.103 -0.145*** -0.061
(0.029) (0.091) (0.038) (0.083)
Tdummy (Jan 08) -0.019 -0.007 -0.005 0.022
(0.016) (0.044) (0.025) (0.027)
HH migration experience (current) 0.274*** -0.275*** 0.248*** 0.178
(0.069) (0.085) (0.076) (0.113)
HH migration experience (past) 0.048 -0.157** 0.201** -0.157
(0.082) (0.077) (0.089) (0.130)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 973 237 662 276
No group 
member Group member No group member Group member
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.040 0.060 -0.166*** -0.106
(0.026) (0.068) (0.050) (0.081)
Tdummy (Jan 08) -0.020 0.012 0.008 0.027
(0.014) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
HH migration experience (current) 0.277*** -0.134 0.372*** 0.535***
(0.073) (0.095) (0.081) (0.133)
HH migration experience (past) 0.228*** 0.195* 0.042 0.213
(0.087) (0.116) (0.106) (0.156)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 1044 324 514 213
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel B: N children (>15 years old)
Table 10. Heterogeneous probit models- marginal effects (c)
Panel A: HH size 
Low (<4) High (>7)
Low (<2) High (>4)
Panel C: N females
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration 
(0 otherwise). (b) Control vars are as in Table 8. (c) We distinguish between 'low' and 'high' sub-groups by using always the first two and
the last two quantiles of all demographic variable distribution.


















Table  11- Occupation at destination (%)
Type of contract of current migrants at destination (%)Family in Mozambique 33.75 33.89
Family abroad 12.97 17.94
Friends in Mozambique 4.53 2.99
Friends abroad 5.16 1.33
Previous Experience 34.69 24.58
Neighbords 0.78 0.66
Government 0.78 3.32
Recruitment agency 4.69 11.63
Other 2.66 3.65
Table 12: Source of help on the migration process
Current Migrants Past MigrantsAPPENDIX
Low (<1) High (>2)
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.008 -0.117***
(0.026) (0.035)
Tdummy (Jan 08) 0.019 -0.009
(0.016) (0.021)
HH migration experience (current) 0.220*** 0.292***
(0.056) (0.072)
HH migration experience (past) 0.179*** 0.172**
(0.060) (0.088)
HH and community controls
Observations 1509 763
Low (<0) High (>2)
Tdummy (Aug 08)b -0.011 -0.112***
(0.023) (0.033)
Tdummy (Jan 08) 0.015 -0.019
(0.014) (0.017)
HH migration experience (current) 0.238*** 0.214***
(0.051) (0.067)
HH migration experience (past) 0.183*** 0.142*
(0.057) (0.086)
HH and community controls
Observations 1754 947
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive 
intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) Control vars are as in Table 8. (c) We distinguish between 'low' and 
'high' sub-groups by using always the first two and the last two quantiles of all demographic variable distribution.
Table A1: Heterogeneous probit models- marginal effects (c)
Panel C: N.of 'adult children' (>15 years old)
Panel D: N.of male 'adult children' (>15 years old)
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table A2. Probit model of positive migration intentions - interaction effects with demographics
(1) (2) (5) (6) (9) (10)
Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.143 0.115 0.014 -0.004 0.110 0.086
(0.116) (0.119) (0.083) (0.086) (0.103) (0.105)
Tdummy (Jan 08) - Placebo -0.057 -0.036 -0.049
(0.055) (0.047) (0.044)
HH size*Tdummy (Aug 08) (a) -0.050** -0.044**
(0.021) (0.021)
Hhsize (a) 0.048 0.042
(0.032) (0.032)
HH size*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (a) 0.012
(0.008)
Nchildren*Tdummy (Aug 08) (a) -0.060* -0.050
(0.031) (0.032)
N. of children (a) -0.049 -0.059
(0.052) (0.052)
Nchildren*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (a) 0.020
(0.015)
Nfemale*Tdummy (Aug 08) (a) -0.076** -0.067**
(0.031) (0.031)
N. of females (a) 0.093** 0.084*
(0.045) (0.046)
Nfemale*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (a) 0.019*
(0.011)
HH migration experience (past) 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.440*** 0.441*** 0.446*** 0.446***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121)
HH migration experience (current) 0.714*** 0.714*** 0.720*** 0.720*** 0.713*** 0.714***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Constant -0.770* -0.742* -0.681 -0.663 -0.758* -0.734*
(0.426) (0.427) (0.419) (0.419) (0.426) (0.426)
Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.027 -0.029 -0.022 -0.017 -0.022 -0.026
(0.063) (0.067) (0.061) (0.066) (0.059) (0.063)
Tdummy (Jan 08) - Placebo -0.004 0.011 -0.008
(0.038) (0.041) (0.038)
Manyhhmembers*Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.249** -0.233**
(0.103) (0.107)
Manyhhmembers (b) 0.026 0.009
(0.141) (0.144)
Manyhhmembers*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (b) 0.033
(0.062)
Manychildren*Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.261** -0.261**
(0.107) (0.112)
Manychildren (b) -0.390*** -0.390***
(0.147) (0.150)
Manychildren*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (b) -0.001
(0.061)
Manyfemales*Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.301*** -0.276**
(0.108) (0.112)
Manyfemales (b) 0.090 0.064
(0.146) (0.148)
Manyfemales*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (b) 0.052
(0.062)
HH migration experience (past) 0.454*** 0.454*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.430*** 0.430***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.123) (0.123) (0.121) (0.121)
HH migration experience (current) 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.754*** 0.754*** 0.746*** 0.746***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.108) (0.108) (0.105) (0.105)
Constant -0.770* -0.768* -0.669 -0.675 -0.711* -0.707*
(0.427) (0.427) (0.419) (0.419) (0.425) (0.425)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701
PANEL A
PANEL B
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) 
Control vars are as in Table 8. (c) IN Panel A household size, N. of children and N. of females in the household are measured as continuos variables. (d) In 
Panel B household size, N. of children and N. of females in the household are measured as dummy variables equal to 1 if the number is equal or higher 
than 6, 4 and 4 respectively.  
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table A3. Probit model of positive migration intentions - interaction effects with demographics
(1) (2) (5) (6) (9) (10)
Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.143 0.112 0.008 -0.011 0.112 0.088
(0.121) (0.124) (0.087) (0.090) (0.109) (0.111)
Tdummy (Jan 08) - Placebo -0.063 -0.038 -0.048
(0.058) (0.050) (0.048)
HH size*Tdummy (Aug 08) (a) -0.052** -0.045**
(0.021) (0.021)
Hhsize (a) 0.072** 0.066*
(0.033) (0.034)
HH size*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (a) 0.014
(0.009)
Nchildren*Tdummy (Aug 08) (a) -0.062* -0.052
(0.033) (0.034)
N. of children (a) -0.069 -0.080
(0.052) (0.052)
Nchildren*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (a) 0.022
(0.016)
Nfemale*Tdummy (Aug 08) (a) -0.080** -0.071**
(0.032) (0.033)
N. of females (a) 0.077 0.068
(0.050) (0.050)
Nfemale*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (a) 0.019
(0.012)
HH migration experience (past) 0.521*** 0.521*** 0.514*** 0.515*** 0.521*** 0.521***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125)
HH migration experience (current) 0.807*** 0.807*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.716*** 0.716***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.112)
Constant -0.024 0.008 0.077 0.097 0.004 0.028
(0.503) (0.503) (0.492) (0.492) (0.500) (0.501)
Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.033 -0.036 -0.028 -0.021 -0.027 -0.031
(0.067) (0.071) (0.065) (0.070) (0.062) (0.066)
Tdummy (Jan 08) - Placebo -0.006 0.013 -0.008
(0.040) (0.044) (0.041)
Manyhhmembers*Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.259** -0.239**
(0.109) (0.113)
Manyhhmembers (b) 0.063 0.043
(0.145) (0.149)
Manyhhmembers*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (b) 0.040
(0.066)
Manychildren*Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.277** -0.277**
(0.115) (0.120)
Manychildren (b) -0.475*** -0.475***
(0.146) (0.149)
Manychildren*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (b) 0.000
(0.066)
Manyfemales*Tdummy (Aug 08) (b) -0.320*** -0.293**
(0.115) (0.120)
Manyfemales (b) 0.048 0.020
(0.154) (0.156)
Manyfemales*Placebo_Tdummy (Jan 08) (b) 0.056
(0.067)
HH migration experience (past) 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.513*** 0.513*** 0.510*** 0.510***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125)
HH migration experience (current) 0.772*** 0.773*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 0.700*** 0.700***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111)
Constant -0.047 -0.043 0.052 0.046 0.037 0.041
(0.501) (0.501) (0.497) (0.497) (0.500) (0.502)
HH controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Community fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701
PANEL A
PANEL B
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b
Control vars are as in Table 8 plus community fixed effects. (c) IN Panel A household size, N. of children and N. of females in the household are measured 
as continuos variables. (d) In Panel B household size, N. of children and N. of females in the household are measured as dummy variables equal to 1 if the 
number is equal or higher than 6, 4 and 4 respectively.  
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2 R 2 RTable A4. Probit model of positive migration intentions - interaction effects with group participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.173*** -0.174***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.057) (0.061)
Tdummy (Jan 08) -0.002 -0.002
(0.037) (0.040)
Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.120 0.140 0.126 0.149
(0.124) (0.127) (0.131) (0.135)
Group participation -0.207 -0.227* -0.166 -0.190
(0.127) (0.131) (0.136) (0.141)
Group*Placebo_Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.039 0.047
(0.064) (0.068)
HH migration experience (current) 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.712*** 0.712***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.111) (0.111)
HH migration experience (past) 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.534*** 0.534***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.128) (0.128)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes
Community fe no no yes yes
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of 
emigration (0 otherwise). (b) Control vars are as in Table 8 (col. 1 and 2) plus community fixed effects (col. 3 and 4). (c) Group is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the housheold is member of one community group.Table A5. Probit model of positive migration intentions - interaction effects with demographics & group participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.067 -0.077 -0.048 -0.050 -0.061 -0.075 -0.075 -0.088 -0.056 -0.059 -0.068 -0.084
(0.068) (0.071) (0.069) (0.073) (0.064) (0.068) (0.072) (0.076) (0.074) (0.078) (0.068) (0.071)
Tdummy (Jan 08) 0.009 -0.011 0.011 0.007 0.010 -0.019 0.011 -0.015 0.014 0.007 0.012 -0.021
(0.030) (0.045) (0.031) (0.048) (0.030) (0.045) (0.033) (0.048) (0.033) (0.052) (0.033) (0.049)
Manyhhmembers_Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.135 -0.098 -0.143 -0.098
(0.170) (0.171) (0.180) (0.181)
Fewhhmembers_Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.179 0.192 0.188 0.204
(0.168) (0.177) (0.176) (0.186)
Manyhhmembers_NOGroup*Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.245** -0.233* -0.254** -0.238*
(0.113) (0.120) (0.120) (0.128)
Manyhhmembers_Group -0.308 -0.345 -0.292 -0.337
(0.225) (0.228) (0.228) (0.232)
Fewhhmembers_Group -0.297* -0.310* -0.218 -0.234
(0.162) (0.168) (0.174) (0.180)
Manyhhmembers_NOGroup -0.192 -0.204 -0.170 -0.187







Manychild_Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.109 -0.082 -0.122 -0.093
(0.203) (0.204) (0.218) (0.218)
Fewchild_Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.109 0.118 0.122 0.134
(0.151) (0.160) (0.159) (0.168)
Manychild_NOGroup*Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.283** -0.293** -0.296** -0.305**
(0.113) (0.121) (0.121) (0.130)
Manychild_Group -0.656*** -0.683*** -0.706*** -0.736***
(0.220) (0.223) (0.224) (0.228)
Fewchild_Group -0.204 -0.212 -0.147 -0.159
(0.166) (0.173) (0.177) (0.184)
Manychild_NOGroup -0.404** -0.395** -0.454*** -0.445**








Manyfemale_Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.195 -0.151 -0.212 -0.162
(0.195) (0.195) (0.211) (0.211)
Fewfemale_Group*Tdummy (Aug 08) 0.154 0.173 0.163 0.187
(0.148) (0.155) (0.156) (0.163)
Manyfemale_NOGroup*Tdummy (Aug 08) -0.291** -0.266** -0.305** -0.277**
(0.119) (0.126) (0.126) (0.134)
Manyfemale_Group -0.355 -0.399 -0.321 -0.370
(0.242) (0.244) (0.252) (0.254)
Fewfemale_Group -0.169 -0.188 -0.136 -0.160
(0.153) (0.159) (0.163) (0.169)
Manyfemale_NOGroup -0.083 -0.109 -0.098 -0.126
(0.194) (0.196) (0.205) (0.207)
Manyfemale_Group*Placebo_Tdummy  0.088 0.099
(0.084) (0.093)
Fewfemale_Group*Placebo_Tdummy  0.039 0.047
(0.085) (0.090)
Manyfemale_NOGroup*Placebo_Tdummy  0.051 0.056
(0.079) (0.085)
HH migration experience (current) 0.599*** 0.599*** 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.652*** 0.652*** 0.673*** 0.673*** 0.703*** 0.703*** 0.723*** 0.724***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
HH migration experience (past) 0.455*** 0.455*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.524*** 0.524*** 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.540*** 0.540***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128)
HH and community controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Community fe no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) Control vars are as in Table 8 (col. 1-12) plus community fixed effects (col. 6-12). (c) Household 
size, N. of children and N. of females in the household are measured as dummy variables equal to 1 if the number is equal or higher than 6, 4 and 4 respectively. In Col. 1-12 base group is hhs with few members (of any category, i.e. total, children 0-15, 
female) and No group participation (same results hold when the base group is hhs with few members and group participation). (c) Group is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the housheold is member of one community group.